Newsletters
Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers
At common law, a corporation's surplus funds could lawfully be loaned to directors and officers of the corporation unless the loan was fundamentally unfair to the shareholders, concealed from the shareholders, or fraudulent. The circumstances under which a corporation may permissibly make loans to directors and officers are now largely governed by statute. The permissibility of such loans varies from state to state. Most jurisdictions have adopted some version of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (Act). Under the Act, a corporation generally cannot make a personal loan to an officer or a director unless the loan has been approved (or subsequently ratified) by a majority of the shareholders. If an approved loan is challenged, judicial review is often focused on whether the loan was fair overall to the corporation and its shareholders.
Anti-Competitive Discrimination By Sellers Under the Clayton Act
The federal Clayton Act contains prohibitions against various specific anti-competitive practices and is designed to supplement the broad prohibitions of the Sherman Act against anti-competitive agreements and monopolization. Section 2 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 13, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, specifically prohibits discrimination in the price of commodities or in commissions, allowances, services, or facilities if such discrimination is anti-competitive.
The Antitrust Exemption for Joint Newspaper Operating Arrangements
The Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1801-1804, provides a limited exemption from antitrust laws for joint operating arrangements between newspapers in a particular locality. The objective of the legislation is to preserve independent reporting and editorial operations of the two newspapers while allowing shared production facilities that through a lowering of costs would allow both newspapers to survive.
Application of the De Facto Merger Doctrine to Acquisition of Corporate Assets
Companies which otherwise are attractive acquisition targets may have contingent liabilities that are difficult to assess. For example, a paint manufacturer may have used ingredients that later prove to be toxic. Present and future liability of the manufacturer for damages from sales of products with those ingredients may be anticipated, but the scope and cost of that liability may be too difficult to determine to support an acquisition value for the manufacturer.
Business & Corporate Entities> Corporations> Shareholders & Other Constituents> Shareholder Duties & Liabilities
(Controlling Shareholder Duties)









